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WHAT EXPLAINS THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY 
AND COMPETITIVENESS? 








This paper addresses the recent evolution of productivity and competitiveness in Catalonia and 
their links with the innovation activity of firms. Firstly, it summarizes the evolution of 
productivity, competitiveness, firms' strategies and the state of innovation. A slowdown in 
productivity growth and increasing revealed difficulties in some world markets are real, and the 
weakness of innovation may be a reason. The paper then quantifies some of the links between 
innovation, productivity and competitiveness. Innovation has a positive impact on productivity 
and competitiveness. First of all, innovation expenditures induce cost advantages and these cost 
advantages are a significant explanation for firms' exports. Furthermore, product innovation 
helps exports, too. Moreover, R&D activities in Catalonia benefit from high spillovers, and 
productivity impact is even higher when firms develop R&D activities outside as well. Despite all 
this, the current level of innovation expenditure is comparatively low and shows signs of lack of 
dynamism. Firms need to switch from the current equilibrium to the requirements of the coming 
years.  
 
Keywords: Labor productivity, Competitiveness, Innovation, Cost. 
 
 
* The author thanks Jordi Vidal-Robert for excellent assistance, Laia Castany for data and discussions, Xiao-Jing Hu for help, 
as well as useful comments by Xavier Vives, Bruno Cassiman, Jordi Ollé Garmendia, all participants at the “Catalonia 
competitiveness” and Xulia Gonzalez, Lourdes Moreno, Diego Rodríguez and Marian Vidal-Fernández. 
 
1 Professor, Financial Management, PricewaterhouseCoopers Chair of Finance, IESE 
  
 





WHAT EXPLAINS THE EVOLUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY 
AND COMPETITIVENESS? 
THE INNOVATION LINK 
 
 
1. Introduction  
It has become commonplace to stress the worrying recent relative deceleration of Catalan and 
Spanish labor productivity growth with respect to the average of European countries, while 
European countries themselves lag with respect to the evolution of labor productivity in the 
United States. When one focuses attention on the performance of Catalonia in international 
markets as an indicator of the competitiveness of its products, the situation also depicts a 
complex scenario. Many firms may be gaining and retaining markets because they are quite 
dynamic in product design and improvement, but the global relative weight of low to medium 
technological goods in Catalan exports is in any case very big, and the dynamism of the 
exports of these goods has been seriously reduced in many cases. Cost and non-cost advantages 
of the products of firms are linked to their innovative capacities in processes and products, and 
it should be explored to what extent the symptoms of productivity and competitiveness are 
linked to the weaknesses of the innovation activities of firms. Catalan firms have traditionally 
shown a slight advantage in the effort to innovate and in the output of such innovation, but 
the level of innovation of the whole system is comparatively very low and the extent of these 
advantages may be small compared with the change that both Catalan and Spanish firms 
should make in order to retain and then improve their world position in the coming years. 
This paper addresses the evolution of productivity and competitiveness in Catalonia during the 
first decade of this century and their links with the innovation activity of firms. It has two 
parts. The first part, which goes from sections 2 to 6, is a descriptive summary of the recent 
evolution of productivity and competitiveness, as well as a characterization of the main traits 
of the innovation efforts of firms. In the second part, section 7 and its subsections, a more 
formal exploration of the links between productivity, competitiveness and innovation is started 
and an attempt is made at quantifying a few relationships. 
The first part uses many recently produced documents to assess firstly the evolution of 
productivity, even at the industry level, and then export and import data to complete the 
picture with the evolution of the advantages revealed in trade. I then take a look at the 
evolution of firms' strategies using a sample of firms coming from the ESEE and divided into a 
sample of Catalan firms, other Spain firms and a specific, more comparable subset of Madrid 
firms. I also explore the basic facts and figures of the innovation activity, using the many 
recent documents produced on the subject. Some new evidence, based on the ESEE sample of  
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firms, turns out to be important for assessing both the advantages of Catalan firms and the 
recent weaknesses shown by all of the firms' innovative activities. A few words about the role 
of public support are added. 
In the second part, I start to address three questions. The first and very basic question is: does 
innovation activity really impact the productivity of the firms and by how much? As the 
answer to the first question must be presumed to be positive, and this is a study focused on a 
geographic area, the second question concerns the geographical location of the activities of the 
firms. In particular, does the geographical location of the innovation activities impact their 
productivity and, if so, how? Third, increased productivity means lower costs, but this is only 
one of the ingredients for competitiveness. The following question concerns what we can say, 
with the data at hand, about the more general relationship between innovation and revealed 
competitiveness, taking into account both the impact of innovation on cost (productivity) and 
the firms' efforts for product innovation. I conclude with a brief summary and conclusions. 
2. A Slowdown of Productivity Growth 
Since the mid-1990's European labor productivity growth (the growth of output minus the 
growth of the employed labor) seems to be lower than the growth of productivity in the United 
States, both in the whole economy and the key sectors of manufacturing and services. And the 
growth of labor productivity in Catalan and Spanish economies has been clearly lower than the 
average growth in European countries. The specific figures can change according to the sources, 
but the phenomenon seems to be well established. Table 1 documents this fact with numbers for 
the period 1995-2003 and Table 2 gives, with some more detail, the figures for 2000-2006.
1 
When one looks with more detail at the differences between labor productivity within the 
countries of the European Union (see Table 3, Fernández and Montolio, 2006, and Montolio, 
2008), one discovers that the average labor productivity of the (until recently) 25 members has 
been growing at a slightly higher pace than the productivity of the 15 former members. 
Correspondingly, the difference in the level of productivity between these two groups had been 
reduced to only 6.5% by 2005. Catalonia, which maintained a tiny advantage on the EU-15 
average in the mid-1990's, has lost this advantage and by 2005 had its productivity located in 
between the productivity levels of the two aggregates. Spain, which initially maintained only a 
weak advantage with respect to the EU-25 aggregate, showed a level of labor productivity 
slightly lower by 2005. 
Table 3 also documents how Catalonia and Spain have nonetheless created employment at 
significant growth levels. The difference with respect to what has happened to employment in 
the average of the rest of the European countries is so important that some have suggested a 
relationship between the slowdown in the growth of productivity and the creation of jobs in 
                                              
1 Labor productivity figures give an average growth of 0.9% for the period 2000-2003 in Table 1 and an (implicit) 
average growth close to 0.2% in Table 2. The reason is that the labor productivity growth of Table 1 is computed by 
OECD as GDP per hour worked and the labor productivity growth of Table 2 is computed from Eurostat sources as 
GDP per employee. These numbers imply that employment would have been growing at a higher pace than total 
hours of work during the period. That is, average working hours would have been falling. In fact, using total hours 
worked from EU KLEMS database to compute labor productivity growth from Eurostat GDP figures produces quite 
similar results as the OECD computations.  
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low productivity industries, particularly construction and services. However, labor reallocation 
by itself can hardly explain the slowdown in productivity growth.
2 
There are available manufacturing estimates of the level of labor productivity at the beginning 
of the new decade by industries, as well as an estimate of the productivity growth of these 
industries in Catalonia during the period 1995-2005 (see Table 4 and Amarelo, 2006). The 
comparison of productivity levels shows that there was a small productivity difference in the 
aggregated level of productivity for manufacturing between Catalonia and the EU-25 and a 
slightly greater difference between Catalonia and Spain. Amarelo (2006) performs a shift share 
analysis which shows that part of the difference between Catalonia and Spain can be attributed 
to the difference of industry structures (around 1/3), and that the different structures explain 
almost none of the difference with respect to Europe (only a 5% of the difference). From these 
level estimates, it is important to remember that the industries in which Catalonia shows a 
higher productivity relative to the EU-25 levels are, significantly enough, industries usually 
classified as low-technology sectors (Non-metals, Textile, Food). 
The most striking fact shows up when one relates the Catalonia/EU-25 productivity differences 
by industries in 2001-2002 to the average growth rates of productivity in these industries for 
the whole period 1995-2005. Figure 1 depicts the relationship.
3 Productivity growth is clearly 
higher in the industries in which Catalonia shows an advantage in productivity and lower in 
most of the industries which show some disadvantage in productivity (namely Chemicals, 
Machinery, Electrical goods, Metals, Transport equipment, Rubber and plastic). The exceptions 
are the Paper and Wood industries, which have a productivity disadvantage and high 
productivity growth. This framework suggests a rather non-convergent growth, which may 
have tended to keep the differences instead of blurring them. 
The most problematic part of this fact is that all sectors with high productivity growth (some of 
them with high productivity advantages) are sectors usually classified as low-technology 
sectors, while all sectors with smaller growth (and some productivity disadvantages) are sectors 
usually classified as medium to high-technology sectors. 
In summary, since the mid-1990's, labor productivity in Catalonia, as in the rest of Spain, has 
shown a slowdown that has deteriorated its relative position with respect to the average labor 
productivity in European Union countries. Productivity growth in Catalonia has in addition 
been relatively high in sectors of low technology content, many of which have a productivity 
advantage, and has been more modest in sectors of higher technological content. 
                                              
2 In fact, shift share analyses using national accounts data tend to show positive effects of the reallocation of labor 
on productivity, because value added labor productivity of services is higher than value added labor productivity in 
the industries with employment losses. 
3 Cassiman and Golovko (2008) find a more positive productivity growth for Chemicals. This fits well with the 
positive commercial role that we find later for this sector. In general, it should be taken into account that the sources 
for many data considered here, the periods covered and the methods used for computation are quite different.  
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3. The Evolution of Revealed Trade Advantages 
This section complements the description of productivity with the account of revealed trade 
advantages. This description more broadly outlines the state of competitiveness, which may be 
based on both productivity advantages and the degree of the presence of other product 
advantages such as novelty, quality and design. That is, on the one hand, looking at revealed 
relative trade advantages is an indirect way to assess the impact of the evolution of 
productivity. Relative productivity gains imply greater cost reductions than do competitors' 
products. If passed on to prices, cost reductions imply a better competitive position in 
international markets. But, on the other hand, revealed trade advantages are also the result of 
the relative position in terms of the products themselves and their characteristics other than 
price. The impact of product characteristics is especially important in markets which possess a 
high degree of product differentiation, as markets of goods of high technological content 
usually do. 
To look at the state of trade, I will use numbers from the detailed description given by Parellada 
and Alvarez, 2007 (see also Fernandez, 2007). Catalonia accounts for an important fraction of 
Spanish exports (around 27% in 2005), and has a non-negligible world export share that has 
increased up to 0.5%. Foreign exchange has mainly an intra-industry character, and has 70% of 
exports concentrated in the EU and 80% in Europe. Imports are intense and concentrated as 
well, and the degree of openness to trade as measured by exports plus imports over value added 
has reached 67.4%, 20 percentage points more than in Spain. The latest years covered by the 
trade data show some evidence of deterioration of the competitive position, apparent in 
examples such as the inability to penetrate the rapidly increasing Asian market and the 
deterioration of the balance in consumer durables. Let's focus the attention on the evolution of 
both the structure of exports and the relative commercial advantage (computed as exports-
imports over the sum of exports and imports) with products classified according to their 
technological content. Table 5 reports the evolution of these aspects (structure and advantage) 
during the broad period that ranges from 1994 to 2005. 
Catalonia has a non-negligible portion of exports of products of high technological content, 
consisting mainly of electronics and pharmaceuticals. With the growth of exports of these 
products over time, their joint share in exports has increased up to 12% while the trade deficit 
has diminished. This is the most dynamic part of exports. It must also be said, however, that the 
trade deficit in electronics has remained virtually the same since the intermediate year 2000. 
Notwithstanding, more than half of Catalan exports are goods of medium-high technological 
content. Most of these products are vehicles and chemicals, which together constitute almost 
40% of total exports. The exports of chemicals have increased in relative terms continuously 
over time and the trade deficit has shrunk. The share of vehicles has slightly decreased while a 
trade deficit has replaced what was almost the only surplus of the 1990's. The evidence on the 
export behavior of other goods in this technological category is also mixed. Significant shares 
of machinery and electrical goods have decreased over time while the deficit has increased. 
Precision instruments and other transport, with small shares, present more positive evolutions. 
Other less important products show sundry behaviors. 
During the same period, exports of goods of low technological content decreased from a quarter 
to one fifth of total exports. The exports of textiles decreased in relative terms while the trade 
deficit grew. The exports of foods, instead, grew to 9% of total exports while the deficit in food  
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products decreased, at least until 2000. The evidence on other, less important goods of low 
technological content is mixed (paper more positive, wood more negative). 
Globally, it seems clear that exports of low technological content are shrinking in relative terms 
(textiles) despite good behavior of some exports (food), and that exports with a high 
technological content (electronics, pharmaceuticals) are increasing their share in total exports 
despite the extreme weaknesses in some high-tech areas (computing). The bulk of exports, 
concentrated in traditional exports of goods of medium-high technological content, have split 
their behavior in good (chemicals) and not so good (vehicles, electrical, machinery). Many other 
smaller components of export have experienced different behaviors too. 
A look at the trade situation depicts a more complex scenario than that of productivity. This is 
reflected in Figure 2, which relates advantages and productivity growth.
4 First of all, in some 
industries, firms may be retaining and even gaining markets based on their dynamism in 
product design and adaptation, despite the modest evolution of productivity and hence costs. 
Indeed, some industries improve their commercial position despite their poor record in 
productivity (pharmaceuticals, chemicals, electronics and other transport). The graph also shows 
the industries that have seen their positions deteriorate despite their high productivity growth 
(non-metals, textiles, wood). The reason is likely to be that, in these industries, which all share 
a low technology content, competition has become at the same time quite cost oriented and 
very tough. Maybe it is extremely difficult to do better in these products given current world 
competition. The figure also shows that other industries have their productivity gains and 
competitiveness more aligned (food and paper for good, vehicles for bad). 
In summary, Catalonia seems to have a quite small fraction of very dynamic exports of goods 
with a high technical content and a shrinking but still bigger fraction of goods of low 
technological content subject to tough cost competition. In the middle, exports tend to be 
concentrated in medium-high technological goods whose export dynamism has been 
heterogeneous. Some cases seem to point to a competitive effort in product characteristics that 
has overridden the evolution of productivity and hence cost. In other cases, an increase in the 
trade deficit accompanied by a low productivity performance seems to point directly to a 
deterioration of the competitive position of firms. 
4. Firms' Strategies to Enhance Competitiveness 
Once productivity and revealed advantages have been described, it seems natural to check the 
evolution of firms’ strategies for enhancing competitiveness. Genescà and Salas (2007), 
henceforth “GS", perform an analysis of the competitiveness of Catalan firms over the period 
from the mid-1990's to the early years of the new millennium. They mostly use firm-level data 
from the ESEE (Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales)
5 because it is the only source that 
allows them to follow and compare a wide range of strategies over time. In what follows, 
I adapt their analysis to an enlarged ESEE sample that covers the period 1990-2006. 
                                              
4 As the available industry breakdown is finer for commercial advantages than for productivity growth, I attribute 
the same productivity growth to different subsectors of a given industry. 
5 The “Encuesta Sobre Estrategias Empresariales” is a firm-level survey of Spanish manufacturing, sponsored by the 
Ministry of Industry, who started to collect data in 1990.  
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In the competitive environment of the 1990's, after the full integration of the Spanish and 
Catalan economies into the EU, firms had to adapt their strategies to compete in a highly open 
and competitive environment. It is true that a few macroeconomic events helped firms to 
sustain competitiveness after the crisis of 1993, such as the devaluations of 1993 and 1995, but 
firms struggled to restructure their activities and reshape their instruments of competition, as 
GS and the data that follow clearly show. I am going to examine how macro facts and firm 
actions resulted in some key changes. I will briefly consider the evolution of firms' costs and 
profitability, actions to differentiate their products, investments in human capital and adoption 
of technology. The analysis of innovative activities is left for the next section. Table 6 first 
presents details on the evolution of the sample of Catalan firms and then shows a comparison 
in the final year (2006) with other subsamples.
6 
We use an unbalanced panel sample including more than 4,000 firms in total, subdivided into 
three subsamples: Catalonia, the rest of Spain and, a subset of the latest sample, Madrid. 
Statistics are always given separately for firms with fewer than 200 workers (small firms) and 
200 or more workers, as the ESEE design requires. A firm is ascribed to Catalonia or Madrid if 
half or more of the industrial employment (in the given year) is located in the corresponding 
autonomous community.
7 Appendix A explains the previous checks carried out with the whole 
ESEE sample to ensure the soundness of the numbers and summarizes the characteristics of the 
particular sample used in the exercise as well as the definition of the variables. The subsample 
numbers are reported in Table A1, which also reports the average size as given by the number 
of workers, the investment per worker, the proportion of exporters and the intensity of exports. 
The average size of small and big firms does not show acute differences across subsamples and 
the most notable difference is the much bigger and increasing proportion of exporters among 
small Catalan firms. The composition by industries of the samples of Catalonia and Madrid is 
given in Table A2. Catalonia shows a much higher proportion of firms in food, textile and 
chemicals; Madrid in paper. A note of caution in analyzing the results: the (not reported) high 
variance of the estimates should be taken into account not to exaggerate small differences. 
Profitability of firms increased rapidly during the 1990's from negative values to a sensible 
positive profitability, as the estimation for the return on assets minus the opportunity costs of 
GS with CB data showed (Central de Balances del Banco de España). This is the same as our 
data on price cost margins and cost of funds show, extending the improvement in profitability 
until 2006. Price cost margins tend to be remarkably stable over time years and quite similar 
for all firms (by size and subsamples). But the yearly cost of funds, which is based on the data 
reported by firms on the current nominal rates paid for the debt with cost, shows a 
continuously decreasing trend. The evolution of the rate of profitability can be roughly assessed 
by multiplying the price cost margin by an average estimate of the sales/assets ratio (1.5-2, say) 
and subtracting a conventional depreciation rate (0.10, say) and the cost of funds. Profitability 
is likely to have evolved from values around -6/0 to values about 4/10. 
                                              
6 Although the sample data start in 1990 I prefer to report statistics from 1991. The first year survey results are 
affected by a few non-comparabilities which can distort the homogeneity of some series over time. 
7 A comparison of many firm-level variables, partly in 2005 and partly of the evolution 1995-2005, also performed 
with ESEE data, can be found in the document Generalitat de Catalunya (2008). Unfortunately, this study uses too 
loose a definition of a Catalan firm, taking as Catalan any firm that has an industrial establishment in Catalonia.  
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Furthermore, labor unit costs show stability for small firms and a continuous sharp reduction 
for big firms in both cases despite the increase of nominal wages over time. Therefore, behind 
the sound profitability, both capital and labor costs show a sensible evolution, which seems to 
exclude cost-related shocks such as constraints to competitiveness. The devaluations may have 
helped additionally to transform these costs into particularly competitive prices in foreign 
markets, but it would be an exaggeration to attribute the good export behavior simply to this 
fact. 
There is an effort to improve the penetration of products through differentiation, and the data 
seem to show that it has been greater for small firms. There is a reduction of the number of 
firms that identify their products as standard over time, important in the case of small firms 
and probably more modest for big firms. And there is a significant increment of the proportion 
of small firms that advertise their products (without a similar trend in the big firms). 
Advertising intensity may be considered roughly constant over time for small and big firms, 
with the latest doubling the proportion of revenue spent on advertising. 
The two indicators of firm efforts to improve human capital show a continuous increase. There 
is a change at the beginning of the new millennium in the number of firms that use temporary 
contracts and especially a big change in the proportion that this type of contract accounts for 
in the employment of the firms that use them. It is true that changes in the regulation of this 
type of contract triggered these changes, but this does not render the firms' reaction less 
significant. In addition, there is a continuous increase in the number of small firms that employ 
graduates and a remarkable increase in the proportion of graduates employed in all firm types. 
Notice, by the way, that the proportion of graduates is roughly the same for small and big 
firms. 
Adoption of new technology is an indicator of how rapidly firms adapt to the new market 
improvements available for technological processes. They give a measure of how updated and 
technologically sophisticated a firm may be considered, but it is not a direct measure of its 
innovation efforts or innovativeness (innovation indicators are explored in the next section). 
These indicators show a relatively quick pace of adoption, more pronounced in the case of the 
smallest firms, which start from more modest and heterogeneous values (more use of digitally 
controlled machine tools and fewer robots). Nothing indicates that this adoption effort may be 
insufficient. 
The main message resulting from the comparison of strategies of Catalan firms with non-
Catalan and Madrid firms is that there are no dramatic differences. There are, of course, some 
different values and, in general, Catalan firms more closely resemble the subset of Madrid firms. 
For example, it is clear that firms in Catalonia and Madrid pay higher wages, although Catalan 
firms show slightly lower unit labor costs. Catalan firms of all sizes also seem more advertising-
intensive and less prone to temporary employment. Small firms use more skilled labor and 
show slightly higher levels of technology adoption. But most of the differences are likely to be 
more related to the composition of the samples and sampling variance than to differing 
strategies. This is also the conclusion when one looks at the variable values over the entire 
period, despite additional noticeable differences. 
To summarize, costs, product differentiation, investment in human capital and new technology 
adoption seem to have followed positive paths that should have been able to enhance 
productivity and competitiveness. This pattern shows a significant reduction of capital and 
labor costs, a quick adoption of new available technology, a clear investment in the human  
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capital attached to firms and a positive, although slightly less pronounced, change in the effort 
for product differentiation. One critical dimension of firms' efforts is still left: innovative 
activities. A brief global look at these activities is the object of the next section. 
5. Innovation Activity 
They are just the indicators of R&D and innovation activity of firms which show the most 
critical values for Catalonia and Spain, especially when they are compared with the values 
reached in other European countries.
8 This is why there is a broad consensus on one of the 
main reasons for the slowdown of productivity and the competitive problems of Catalan and 
Spanish firms (for Catalonia see, for example, the recent Busom collective evaluation, 2006; the 
Busom and Garcia-Fontes chapter, 2007; or the Fernández and Montolio document, 2006).
9 Let 
me briefly summarize the main facts, with a particular stress on the activities of the firms. I will 
expand the evidence on those activities using the sample presented in the previous section. 
The efforts on R&D and innovation have, in fact, continuously increased in Catalonia and Spain 
since the mid-1990's, however they are measured (in terms of inputs or outputs), but their levels 
remain clearly far from the levels reached in comparable European countries and regions. Table 7 
shows the evolution of the most used indicator, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP, until the 
latest year for which there are comparable data for all the instances of interest. Innovation 
expenditures show a similar pattern. Catalonia shows higher levels of relative expenditure than 
Spain as a whole, which has evolved in parallel, but the effort still remains far from the 
indicators for the EU-15 and even the EU-25.
10  This expenditure indicator also seems to 
suggest a better position of Catalonia in privately financed R&D and a better position of Spain 
in publicly financed R&D. 
Obviously, R&D expenditures as a percentage of GDP is only an aggregate indicator, the 
analysis of whose values should be accompanied by an exhaustive exploration of all 
environmental factors that may determine the development of innovative activities and their 
efficiency: infrastructures, science system, human capital, degree of competition, regulation 
(with special emphasis on the aspects of firm creation and the treatment of failures), and public 
support. Spain – and especially Catalonia – may lag in some infrastructures, the science system 
may be evolving only slowly into “excellence” and industry-oriented systems, and regulation of 
industry entry and exit shows much rigidity in practice, but the degree of competition has 
sharply increased, human capital seems quite developed in many aspects, and public support 
(subsidies, fiscal advantages) apparently constitutes one of the most generous systems, albeit 
quite uncoordinated (on all of this, see Busom, 2006). None of these factors in isolation nor the 
combination of them seem to provide a clear explanation for the weakness of the firm- level 
activities. 
                                              
8 For example, the European Innovation Scoreboard 2006, using an index based on 7 indicators referring to 2003, 
and considering 208 European Regions, assigned the 82nd position in the ranking to Catalonia (after the Spanish 
regions of Madrid, the Basque Country and Navarra). 
9 Additional descriptive evidence can be found in ACC1Ó CIDEM/COPCA (2008). 
10 Busom (2006) contains a comparative analysis with other comparable European regions, and the conclusion of this 
analysis is a lower Catalan effort.  
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The European innovation data allow for some detailed comparison of the activities of Spanish 
firms with the activities of firms in similar European countries.
11 Let me briefly summarize 
some results from a comparison at the beginning of the new millennium with the 
manufacturing firms of France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Spanish firms combine 
different activities (intramural R&D, subcontracted R&D, technological payments) 
heterogeneously, as happens everywhere, with an important difference in the level at which 
these activities are performed. The proportion of firms that undertake innovative activities is 
clearly lower than in any other country, and the occasional performers are more numerous. The 
levels of expenditure relative to sales or innovation effort of firms that perform innovative 
activities are also low. The structure of the industry plays a minor role in that it is industry to 
industry where the proportion of firms with R&D employment is lower and the expenditure 
efforts are smaller. Strikingly, the number of innovations that firms get from these activities, 
measured by the proportion of innovators, seems roughly similar to the number obtained in 
other countries, but there is a much lower propensity to patent the innovations. Technological 
cooperation is clearly weaker than in the rest of the countries. These traits seem to have hardly 
changed since then. 
Table 8 provides some firm level indicators of R&D and innovation activities that come from 
the ESEE sample. This time the table includes comparable time data for the three subsamples: 
Catalonia, the rest of Spain, Madrid. The table reports the proportion of firms with R&D 
expenses, the intensity of such expenses for the performing firms, and the proportion of firms 
introducing process and product innovations each year. It is worth noticing that the R&D effort 
of the smallest performers tends to be systematically higher than the effort of the corresponding 
big firms. This is a sign of the importance of the set up and fixed costs associated with 
innovative activities, reflected heavily in the relative expenditures of the firms with relative 
small-scale sales (see, for example, González, Jaumandreu and Pazo, 2005). 
The table reflects a couple of worrying trends, which have affected all firms. Firstly, it seems 
true that effort has tended to decrease since 2000, at least in the big firms, and that the 
proportion of R&D performers seems at best stabilized. Secondly, the proportion of firms 
introducing process and product innovations has also tended to decrease quite consistently this 
decade.
12 The reasons for this lack of dynamism of R&D investments and outputs in a period of 
high growth of firms' sales constitute a puzzle, especially taking into account the state of 
weakness of innovative activities and the symptoms of productivity and competitiveness 
effects.
13 
                                              
11 However, there have been only a few international comparisons that exploit these data. Abramovsky, Jaumandreu, 
Kremp and Peters (2004) is a comparison of some firm-level indicators for 2000 in France, Germany, Spain and the 
United Kingdom, based on the elaboration of CIS3 data contained in IEEF (2004). Cotec (2004) discusses the 
comparison results. García-Fontes (2006) also includes some comparisons based on CIS data for 2003. 
12 Huergo and Moreno (2006), in a regression analysis up to 2002, already picked up some of this inflection by 
means of time dummies. But the ESEE sample, which started a process of deterioration just at this time, has made it 
difficult until now to distinguish if this was a true underlying trend or a data problem. Of course more research on 
this point is highly desirable. 
13 It is true that high sales may be part of the explanation, i.e., R&D has not grown at the same pace as sales and this 
implies a lower effort. Also a slight decrease of effort has characterized many European countries since the beginning 
of the current decade. In Catalonia and Spain the strangest thing is that this happens despite the low initial level of 
effort.  
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The table also reflects at least three important facts from the point of view of Catalonia firms' 
activities. First, the proportion of firms with R&D expenses is higher in Catalonia than 
elsewhere and much higher in the case of small firms (in particular compare the proportion of 
firms with R&D expenses in Catalonia and Madrid). Second, the average R&D effort of Catalan 
firms is, however, unequivocally smaller than the effort of the Madrid performers in the case of 
big firms and even lower than the effort of the firms of the rest of Spain in the case of small 
firms. Third, Catalonia does not seem to be an exception to the stagnation of effort and the 
diminishing introduction of process and product innovations, which remain slightly higher for 
Catalan firms. 
In summary, efforts in R&D and innovation have continuously increased in Catalonia and 
Spain since the mid-1990's but their levels remain clearly far from the levels reached in 
comparable European countries. The proportion of firms that undertake innovative activities is 
lower, the occasional performers are more numerous, the innovation efforts of firms that 
perform innovative activities and technological cooperation are low as well, and none of this is 
explained by an industry composition effect. Firms seem to produce innovations at a significant 
rate but there is a much lower propensity to patent the innovations. Two worrying trends have 
recently affected all firms: effort has been at best stagnant during the first decade of the new 
millennium, and the proportion of firms introducing process and product innovations has 
tended to decrease. 
Catalan firms have enjoyed an advantageous position until now, both in the number of firms 
performing innovative activities and in the introduction of process and product innovations, 
but in a context of weak general activity. And this is accompanied by a much lower innovative 
effort in the firms that perform these activities, perhaps in part because of the particular 
composition of activities. In any case, Catalonia also shows signs of a lack of dynamism during 
the first decade of the new millennium. 
6. Support of Innovation 
In all developed countries, governments adopt an active role in the stimulation of innovation. 
In particular, public policy channels significant amounts of money towards reinforcing 
innovation activities of firms. There is a practical reason, the widespread conscience of the 
importance of innovation for growth, and there is an economic justification, as well: the 
positive impact R&D investments have on welfare greatly surpasses their cost, but only a small 
part of this positive impact is appropriable privately in the form of revenue. Hence, private 
investments tend to be suboptimal. There are two main forms of public support of innovative 
activities, subsidies to the firms that apply for them at the relevant agencies, and fiscal 
advantages, in principle available to any firm with accounting expenses on innovation. There is 
an increasing body of literature that has taken seriously the task of understanding and 
evaluating the effects of these programs; something important given the desirability of their 
presumed impact and the level of expenses involved (see Jaumandreu, 2007). 
Do these incentives stimulate investments by firms? Getting a convincing answer to this 
question is a difficult task because of the many methodological problems involved. Firms 
granted by agencies are generally doubly selected: they autoselect themselves at the time of 
applying and they are then selected by agencies. In addition, the funds that they receive are 
likely to be highly correlated with their ability to perform innovation. It is then very difficult to  
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argue that one has been econometrically able to separate the additional R&D done in response 
to support from the extra support just obtained because the firm is especially able. In fact, 
many international studies using supposedly up-to-date methodologies get suspiciously high 
effects of subsidies that are likely to be the effect of endogeneity problems. Similar problems 
appear in the analysis of the role of tax allowances. 
Spain and Catalonia share a fiscal system that tries to provide incentives to innovate, especially 
after the significant reform introduced at the end of the 1990's, and a set of subsidies available 
to firms through different state and autonomous community agencies. Fiscal advantages and 
exemptions, as well as subsidies, are costly policy instruments, and countries engage in 
recurring debates on their effectiveness and hence desirability. The Spanish economic 
authorities, for example, have recently expressed their intention to reduce a big part of the 
current fiscal allowances in the near future. The main questions involved in the assessment of 
the economic support of innovation are whether firms are really stimulated to undertake 
research projects that would not have been undertaken in its absence, how important these 
effects are, and whether the policy instruments are adequately designed and work efficiently 
enough to achieve the potential effects. I am going to briefly summarize the Spanish evidence 
on these points, treating the impact of subsidies first and then the impact of tax allowances. 
In Spain, Busom (2000), with firm-level data from the CDTI agency, gave only a partially 
positive answer to the primary question, suggesting replacement of private funds (“crowding 
out”) for a high fraction of subsidies. More recently, González, Jaumandreu and Pazo (2005), in 
a study carried out with ESEE data, which describes the state of Spanish subsidies during the 
1990's, try to answer the same question. They use a tighter theoretical model, including set-up 
costs of R&D, and highly sophisticated econometric methods. Subsidies are allowed to have 
effects in two dimensions: the stimulation of expenses by firms that otherwise would not incur 
R&D investments, and the enlargement of the investments of firms that would have carried 
them out in any case. 
The study measures both actual and potential effects. On the side of actual effects it finds: 
1) that R&D expenditures of some fraction of small firms are actually dependent on subsidies, in 
the sense that these firms would stop performing R&D in the absence of them; 2) no "crowding 
out" or substitution of public funds for private funds, and even a (modest) increase in the 
private expenses that the firm had dedicated to the investment in the absence of subsidies. A 
complementary significant estimate is that, according to the current practices, a high proportion 
of subsidies go to firms that would have performed the innovative activities anyway. This is 
probably only the result of a proper selection of applicants with strict risk aversion practices, 
but suggests an important neglect on the part of public policy towards the inducing dimension 
of public support. 
On the side of potential effects, the study estimates some counterfactuals: 1) almost half of the 
non-performer large firms could be induced to do so if they received financing of 10% or less 
of the likely expenses they would incur; 2) significant fractions of small non-performing firms 
could also be induced to perform R&D by funding slightly higher percentages of their expenses. 
The suggestion is, therefore, that current public expenditures could be both usefully enlarged 
and used more efficiently. 
A striking fact, which affects fiscal allowances, is that a significant number of the firms 
“ignore” and/or do not apply the possible fiscal deductions for their innovative activity (see 
Corchuelo and Martínez-Ros, 2008). This phenomenon is especially extended among the  
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smallest firms. The word “ignorance” is likely to reflect the lack of serious interest in applying 
and lack of interest in the details more than ignorance of the deductions. The “know but do not 
apply” answers probably reflect a more careful consideration of the pros and cons. Expert 
evidence as well as the work quoted above suggest that many firms anticipate that the costs of 
participating would be higher than the implied benefits. Small and medium firms are likely to 
be deterred by the costs of formalizing the accounting needed to access the support, including 
the necessary matches between engineers and accountants to define innovative expenses, 
barriers to be added to the start up and fixed costs of innovative activities. 
An econometrically sensible evaluation of the effects of tax allowances during the 1990's is 
Corchuelo (2006). The study is cast in the traditional approach of evaluating the elasticity of 
R&D investments with respect to the cost of capital; this variable embodying the tax reductions. 
The study takes into account the likely double effect of the incentives: the effect on the decision 
of performing R&D and the effect on the effort, trying to give account of the endogeneity 
problems. It finds a positive effect of the expected reductions in the cost of capital in the 
decision to start the innovation activities. And it calculates an elasticity of the R&D effort with 
respect to the cost of capital bigger than unity, which increases with the presence of firm 
liquidity constraints. There are still no studies using more recent data which use the suitable 
econometric tools for this type of assessment. 
In summary, both tax deductions and subsidies seem to have played a role, even if modest, in 
the stimulation of R&D investments. The reasons for the weak results seem to lie in their cost of 
implementation in the case of fiscal deductions, and their conservative application in the case 
of subsidies. Studies point out that there is a role for the increase of resources dedicated to such 
policies as well as for a more efficient application of the incentives involved. 
7. Innovation, Productivity and Competitiveness: A Look into their Links 
Let's perform a few exercises with recent data to assess the current links between these three 
variables. These exercises take advantage of the recent release of a new firm-level database for 
innovative activities (PITEC). The data come from the combination of the old R&D and 
Innovation-specific surveys conducted by the statistical office INE. It is being consciously 
constructed as a panel database, and includes an enormous amount of information related to 
the innovation activities perfectly comparable with the microdata on the innovation of many 
other European countries. The total sample consists of several subsamples, from which the most 
important are the subsample of firms with 200 workers and more, and the subsample of firms 
of any size performing R&D. Both subsamples have quite a broad coverage. I use the recently 
released data for the period 2003-2006 (see details in Appendix B). This gives a total sample of 
almost 10,000 firms and more than 33,000 observations with an important overrepresentation 
of firms with innovative activities but with a significant fraction of non-performers, too (about 
15%). 
Recall from the introduction that the exercises address three questions. The first and very basic 
is: does innovation activity really impact the productivity of the firms and by how much? The 
second refers to the geographical location of the activities: does the geographical location of 
the innovation activities affect their productivity? Third, increased productivity means lower 
costs, but this is only one of the ingredients for competitiveness. The following question 
concerns what we can say about the relationship between innovation and revealed  
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competitiveness, taking into account both the impact of innovation on cost (productivity) and 
the firm's efforts for product innovation. 
7.1. Innovation and Productivity 
Measuring the impact of innovation expenditures on productivity has been a standard exercise 
since Griliches (1979) introduced the basic framework. The production function (usually a 
standard Cobb-Douglas function) is augmented in an input which represents the efforts made 
by the firm to increase the relevant information, the “knowledge capital”. Knowledge capital is 
usually computed from the accumulation of R&D/innovation expenditures over time, 
conveniently depreciated as they relate to earlier moments of time. The impact of this “capital” 
gives us the measure of the impact of innovation in multifactor productivity (productivity once 
the contribution of all the other factors is taken into account). Two recent trends depart from 
this tradition. First, as direct information on outputs of innovation have become available 
(innovation counts, patents, etc.), researchers have started the use of more complex 
modelizations in which innovation expenditures enhance innovation outputs and innovation 
outputs influence productivity. See Griffith, Huergo, Mairesse and Peters, 2007, for a nice 
example.
14 Second, researchers have started to relax the strict assumptions on linearity and 
certainty which characterize the knowledge capital model, allowing for more general impacts of 
innovation measurable in the context of the recent advances for the estimation of production 
functions (see Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2007). Here I am going to use the simplest version 
of the old modeling as a quick legitimate way to assess the impact of innovative expenditure. 
Let's measure multifactor productivity by a Cobb-Douglas function in logs, including firm-level 
physical capital and labor, splitting multifactor productivity into two parts: firstly, the part 
attributable to influences other than innovation activity, picked up by industry deviations with 
respect to the constant and time evolution of productivity with respect to the first year;
15 and 
secondly, the part attributable to innovation as picked up by the coefficient representing the 
elasticity of output with respect to “knowledge capital” multiplied by the value of the log of 
this capital. That is, let the production function be 
y =consM + consS +industrydummies+ timedummies+αk +βl+εc + u 
where the small letters y, k, l and c represent natural logarithms of output, capital, labor and 
“knowledge capital”, respectively; consM and conss are constants for manufacturing and 
services, and u is an uncorrelated disturbance. 
As there is no information on materials, the materials/sales ratio is assumed to be constant (and 
absorbed by the relevant constant) and the elasticities should be interpreted as value-added 
elasticities.  K and C, the two capitals, are constructed for each firm by cumulating the 
corresponding investments (physical investment, innovation expenditures), starting from a 
presample capital estimate and using a depreciation rate equal to 0.1. The presample capital is 
constructed by assuming that the firm has always been investing at a rate equal to the average 
                                              
14 An extension of this approach consists of measuring the impact of innovation on other firm outcomes. Harrison, 
Jaumandreu, Mairesse and Peters (2008) find important positive effects of innovation on firm employment. 
15 Below we include another variable in the regression and this set.  
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rate that is observed. This is a particularly rough approximation in the case of C but it is known 
that estimations are not very sensitive to this type of computation. We only use firms observed 
for at least two years, i.e., the unbalanced panel consists of firms with 2, 3 or 4 time 
observations. I include 29 industry dummies for the manufacturing industries and 20 for the 
services industries. 
Table 9 shows the results of the estimation. The production function coefficients look sensible 
even if the relative magnitude of labor and capital coefficients could probably be balanced by 
treating endogeneity. Returns to scale seem to be constant in manufacturing and somewhat 
decreasing in services. Productivity results are not likely to be very sensitive to these aspects of 
the estimation. 
When the entire sample is used (regression 1), the elasticity of C looks small. When only 
performers are included, the elasticity is multiplied by 3 (regression 2). This just happens 
because of the exclusion of non-performers in regression 2 (less than 15% of the sample). It 
turns out that non-performers tend to have a surprisingly bigger productivity than performers, 
even if innovation expenditures clearly enhance the productivity of performers. Regression 3 
improves the estimate of the elasticity by finding and including a partial explanation for this 
fact in the equation. Non-performers that belong to a group of firms (firms are asked in the 
survey if they belong to a conglomerate of firms) show a high “unexplained” productivity. This 
shows how important it is to be careful at this firm-level analysis: forms of vertical integration 
of firms can produce levels of productivity as high as own innovation expenditures give, only 
apparently unrelated to innovation. The reason for this productivity is probably the “level of 
innovativeness” of the “parent” firm. Regressions 4 and 5 show the results for performers in 
manufacturing and services. The role of innovation in enhancing productivity seems even 
higher in services than in manufacturing. 
The main lesson that can be drawn from this first exercise is that innovation expenditures and 
activity strongly influence total factor productivity. Even controlling for detailed industry-level 
productivity effects, products of firms show a high elasticity with respect to the R&D 
expenditures embodied in the “knowledge capital of the firm”. This elasticity is similar or even 
higher than the elasticity with respect to physical capital. One can argue that a better control of 
endogeneity (i.e., the reverse relationship by which we should expect higher R&D investments 
in the most productive firms) could modify the specific value of this coefficient, but the result is 
by no means important and aligned with the results of more refined estimates. 
7.2. The Geographical Location of Innovation 
Given a criterion and enough data, it seems relatively easy to establish the “nationality” or 
“multinationality” of a firm. We can alternatively look at the nationality and relative shares of 
the shareholders, the country where the headquarters are located, the composition of the board 
of directors, etc. It is much less easy to give a location where knowledge is produced. 
Innovative knowledge seems to come in a big part from spillovers of others' innovative 
activities, even if the absorption of these spillovers needs specific activities and expenditures. 
Spillovers can travel long distances, but they seem to be clearly reinforced by the proximity of 
similar innovative activities or, more generally, the accumulation of innovative resources. A 
recent paper by Griffith, Harrison and Van Reenen (2006) has shown that those United 
Kingdom multinationals that locate some R&D activities in the United States in order to gain 
access to spillovers from a more advanced technological environment show a higher total factor  
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productivity. Literature has suggested that location of R&D activities is strategic and has called 
the action of looking for favorable environments “sourcing”. 
Unfortunately, we have no detailed data on the firm's world location of establishments or even 
on the dependent relationships of parent companies that can have a similar effect. A crucial 
input for the assessment of innovativeness of firms with location of part of their production in 
Catalonia would be to know the extent to which they can enjoy some sourcing around the 
world. We have some data on the location of the R&D activities of firms throughout Spanish 
territory. Hence, we can try to assess the presence of spillovers at this limited level. This is 
important because it can give us a much broader idea of what we need to understand by 
innovation as a source of productivity. Let's consider a model in the Griliches (1986) tradition 
by which the previous “knowledge capital” framework can be extended to ask whether different 
types of R&D (private vs. federal, or basic vs. applied) are equally “potent” in generating 
productivity growth. In particular, let's consider the following effective “knowledge capital” 
C
* = C0 + CC(1+δ +δMsM )+ CM (1+δ +δCsC) 
where Cc represents expenditure located in Catalonia, CM expenditure located in Madrid and Co 
expenditure located elsewhere, and the s's stand for shares of expenditure, i.e.,                  with 
                          . The idea is that innovation activities located in Catalonia or Madrid have an 
extra impact on productivity, presumably because of the concentration of spillovers in these 
two places. But, in addition, a firm locating expenditures in both places at the same time is 
likely to enjoy mutual spillovers from the activities.
16 We have 
lnC
* ≈ lnC +δ(sC + sM )+ (δC +δM )sCsM  
and the model can be tested by including the sum and the product of the firm expenditure 
shares in Catalonia and Madrid in the regression. 
Of course the model is too simple and, in the absence of different costs, the optimal location of 
a firm with innovation activities in Catalonia and Madrid would be to split them half and half. 




this is left for future research. 
The data include the detailed distribution of R&D personnel across autonomous communities, so 
we are going to split C according to the proportion of R&D in each location. In the global 
sample, there are 29.5% observations with R&D employment in Catalonia, 15.8% in Madrid and 
59.6% elsewhere. Therefore, Catalonia and Madrid together concentrate 45.3% of the 
observations of R&D employment. About 73 firms (281 observations) show simultaneous R&D 
employment in Catalonia and Madrid. 
Table 10 summarizes the results. There is an enormous difference of performing innovative 
expenditures in Catalonia, Madrid or elsewhere. The impact of innovation expenditure doubles 
if expenditure is performed in Catalonia or in Madrid (regressions 1 and 2). But, in addition, 
there is evidence of mutual spillovers from performing expenditures in the two places at the 
                                              





 C =C0 +CC +CM 
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same time (regressions 3 and 4). Estimates are not very precise because of the small number of 
observations and, perhaps, the roughness of the model. But the evidence seems incontestable. 
One could perhaps argue that it is not fully structural, in the sense that we do not know which 
part should be attributed to the most productive firms choosing to locate R&D activities in both 
places. But any model for this should just start by recognizing the incentives to do that. 
To summarize, there are enormous geographical differences in the productivity impact of 
innovation. The impact of innovation expenditure doubles if expenditure is performed in 
Catalonia or Madrid and there is evidence of mutual spillovers from performing expenditures 
in the two places at the same time. The general lesson is that R&D activities can have a very 
different impact on productivity according to its location, presumably due to spillovers, and 
that firms' sourcing (strategic location decisions to absorb spillovers) may be important in 
enhancing productivity. In particular, although we have no direct data to test for the relevance 
of international outsourcing, our evidence on geographical spillovers at the state level suggests 
that the weakness of this aspect may determine a negative impact on the productivity of 
Spanish and Catalan firms. One may also ask why, given the evidence of spillovers, the number 
of firms with simultaneous activities in Catalonia and Madrid is not higher. 
7.3. Does Innovation Reinforce Competitiveness? 
Is innovation related to competitiveness and, if so, to what extent? We can try to obtain some 
insights on this question by performing a simple exercise that relates the exports of firms to the 
innovation effects estimated in the previous equations. I am going to suppose that any 
productivity and hence cost advantage is a price advantage (this can be a strong assumption 
because firms may use productivity advantages to keep prices higher). From the first exercise, 
we can construct an estimate of the percentage cost advantage of each firm not related to 
innovation (non-innovation cost advantages) and an estimate of the percentage cost advantage 
of each firm that may be attributed to innovation (innovation-related cost advantages). 
I construct them as the  predicted values  of  expected  total  productivity  
conditioned in the non-innovation-related and the innovation-related variables, respectively. In 
the first conditioning set, we mainly have the industry and time dummies. In the second set, we 
have knowledge capital and spillovers. Both advantages are measured in percentage points with 
respect to the mean and with respect to the absence of innovation, respectively. We can 
presume that exports are related to these two types of advantages and, in addition, to the 
attractiveness of products reached by means of product innovation. I am going to see how far a 
model relating the exports of the firms to these three variables goes. Specifically, I use the 
model 
Exports=exp(β0 +β1Non −innovationc.a.+β2Innovation−relc.a.
+β3productInnovationdummy+β4 lnSize+ u)  
where β1 and β2 coefficients can be interpreted as semi-elasticities, which measure how many 
percentage points of increase in exports we get by one additional percentage point in the 
measured advantage. Product innovation is a dummy and hence β3 directly measures the 
   E(y −αk −βl−cons) 
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average percentage increase in exports attributable to the presence of product innovation.
17 The 
regression also includes a variable to control for the size of the firm (the logarithm of the 
number of workers). Its coefficient β4 is simply an elasticity. Regressions are carried out in 
Manufacturing, where exports are important and best defined. 
Regression 1 of Table 11 differs a little from the model above and is mainly carried out to check 
the consistency with the results in Cassiman and Golovko (2007). I estimate a simple model of 
linear probability for exporting where the coefficients should be interpreted as giving the 
increase in the probability of exporting associated to each variable. Results tell us that there is a 
high association between innovation activities and propensity to export. The probability of 
exporting for firms that have recently carried out product innovations is 9% higher. Similarly, 
the coefficient on the innovation-related cost advantages allows us to compute that 9% is also 
approximately the additional probability for firms that have an R&D-related cost advantage of 
about 40%. 
Regressions 2 to 5 of Table 11 present the results of the above model. They firstly show that all 
cost advantages together with product innovation explain a big proportion of the variance of 
exports (around 50%). The innovation-related cost advantages have an important impact on 
exports, much stronger than non-innovation cost advantages. Additionally, firms with product 
innovation tend to have, on average, 24% more exports. When both innovation-related cost 
advantages and product innovation are included together, the impact of product innovation 
tends to become smaller and non-significant. This probably means that, conditional on 
exporting, firms increase exports mainly through the cost advantages embodied in their 
products, even the innovative products. 
The interaction of the main model parameters with a dummy indicating R&D activities located 
in Catalonia seems to say that the relevant model is not very different for Catalan firms. It can 
be said, however, that Catalan firms seem to rely somewhat less on the non-innovation related 
advantages. 
To summarize, cost advantages, cost advantages related to innovation, and product innovations 
all explain significant portions of variance of exports across firms. The advantages of product 
i n n o v a t i o n s ,  h o w e v e r ,  t e n d  t o  f a d e  w h e n  i n c l u d e d  a t  t h e  s a m e  t i m e  a s  t h e  m e a s u r e d  c o s t  
advantages acquired through innovation. This suggests that successful product innovations of 
the firms that export have been associated with simultaneous process innovations that improve 
the cost of the products. At the same time, cost advantages linked to innovation have a bigger 
impact on exports than any other cost advantage. 
8. Conclusions 
The current level of innovation expenditure is comparatively low and shows signs of lack of 
dynamism. This sharply contrasts with the apparent effort of firms to become more competitive, 
and may have consequences on the evolution of productivity and competitiveness. Perhaps the 
explanation is that firms have felt comfortable for some time in an equilibrium characterized by 
                                              
17 I only consider the product innovations of firms larger than 20 workers; product innovation of the firms with 
fewer than this number of workers seems to show some anomalies.  
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a mild technological content, a pattern of world intra-industry specialization, which required 
only modest innovation. Only a small proportion of firms are in activities of a high 
technological content. In addition, many commercial partnerships developed after full European 
integration may have allowed exports to develop based on the specialization of Catalan and 
Spanish firms in applying the other's technology more than developing it. This may well 
explain why there is even a fringe of firms that, as of today, do not even feel the need to 
innovate. Finally, the available resources and cumulated ability may have also favored process 
innovation over product innovation, and even small product developments not worthy of 
patenting. 
Despite this, Innovation expenditures are found to have a big impact on productivity and 
competitiveness. Cumulated R&D expenditures determine a big part of productivity and hence 
cost advantages of firms. R&D activities of firms seem to access intense spillovers when located 
in the geographical places that concentrate innovative activities. And product differentiation as 
well as cost advantages impact competitiveness, explaining a big part of the differences in firm 
exports. This reinforces the idea that the present equilibrium is far from exploiting all the 
impact that investment in innovative activities may have. 
The incentives to switch from the current situation to the requirements of the coming years will for 
sure come from market pressure but can also be reinforced by a conscious support of the activities 
oriented in the right direction. Catalonia needs more firms oriented to activities of high 
technological content; innovation activities of firms oriented to more radical and patentable 
innovations and an extra effort in the development of new products and differentiated products 
without abandoning the constant innovation in process. There are several ways to achieve that, and 
the role of the environmental system of science-technology is important. But one key is the 
development of a fraction of firms equipped with the will to become international players that 
actively practice “sourcing” at the best international sources of technology with the aim of 
reinforcing their own developments. Coordination of efforts and absorption of spillovers at the 
state level is also a step towards this. Economic policy should be able to support all this 
actively, keeping help available for any innovative activity but also actively making more 
ambitious specific projects cheaper despite their risks. Sensible proposals would be the 
enlargement of funds to be allocated to support risky innovative projects, giving priority to 
product innovation, sourcing plans and investments abroad, as well as the transformation of 
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Appendix A 
The “Encuesta sobre Estrategias Empresariales” (ESEE) survey is a firm-level survey of Spanish 
manufacturing sponsored by the Ministry of Industry. The unit surveyed is the firm, not the 
plant or the establishment. At the beginning of this survey in 1990, 5% of firms with up to 200 
workers were sampled randomly by industry and size strata. All firms with more than 
200 workers were asked to participate, and more or less 70% of all firms of this size chose to 
respond. Some firms vanish from the sample, due to both exit and attrition, but the two reasons 
can be distinguished, and attrition has remained within acceptable limits. To preserve 
representativeness, samples of newly created firms were added to the initial sample every year. 
This survey provides the unique long-term data source at the firm level on decision variables 
and, in particular, data about the firms' innovative activities. At the beginning of the new 
millennium, the continuity of the survey was put into question and subsequent data collection 
went through some sampling shocks and weakened control, so they may show some relative 
quality problems. An obvious question is whether the results on a given variable may be 
considered a good representation of what happened in manufacturing or have been influenced 
by fluctuations in representativeness. To check that this is not the case in the variables used in 
this study, we proceeded as follows. 
The total number of firms taking part in the ESEE survey from 1990 to 2006 is 4,357, giving an 
unbalanced panel with a total of 30,827 time observations. Some firms, however, do not answer 
specific questions. A list of basic variables was then decided (slightly longer than the list 
below), and the subset of observations with values for each of the variables in the list was 
selected. Dropping a few anomalous values, this produced a set of 4,017 firms with a total of 
27,392 time observations. Two subsamples were then selected from this sample: the subset 
consisting of the firms that remain in the sample a minimum of 14 consecutive years (the most 
critical values for the continuity of the series may be the years from 2001 to 2003, always 
included in this selection), and the subset of firms which remain in the sample all 17 years from 
1990 to 2006. The first sample consists of 436 firms and 7,078 observations (25%) and the 
second sample has 261 firms and 4,437 observations (16%). Both samples produced surprisingly 
similar patterns in the evolution of all variables with respect to the whole sample.
18 This result 
implies that there is no apparent selection-induced difference and hence that the whole sample 
can be safely used for inference. If there is some bias in the results, it should be a bias 
determined from the initial ESEE sampling. 
The total sample of 4,017 firms has been subdivided into three subsamples: Catalonia, the rest 
of Spain and Madrid. A firm is ascribed to Catalonia or Madrid if half or more of the industrial 
employment (in the given year) is located in the corresponding autonomous community. The 
subsample numbers are reported in Table A1, where the average size as given by the number of 
workers, the investment per worker, the proportion of exporters and the intensity of exports are 
also reported. 
In what follows, we explain the variables employed to construct the means reported in the 
tables: 
No. of workers = Average number of workers during the year. 
                                              
18 The three samples also show quite a similar structure by industries.  
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Investment per worker (thousand Euros) = Investment in equipment divided by the number of 
workers. 
Proportion of firms with exports = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
non-zero exports. 
Export intensity (Exports/Sales) = Value of exports over sales. 
Price Cost Margin = Value of production minus variables costs (wage bill plus intermediate 
consumption) over the value of production. 
Cost of funds = Weighted sum of the cost of the firm values for two types of long-term debt: 
long-term debt with banks and other long-term debt. 
Wage (thousand Euros) = Wage bill divided by the number of workers. 
Labor unit cost = Wage bill divided by output. 
Product is standard = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm reports that the 
product is standard (as opposite to specifically designed). 
Sales through own sales network = Proportion of sales done through the own sales network. 
Proportion of firms that advertise = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
non-zero advertising expenditures. 
Advertising expenditure over sales (0/00) = Advertising expenditures divided by sales and 
multiplied by 1,000. 
Proportion of firms with temporary workers = Dummy variable that takes value 1 when the firm 
has non-zero temporary workers. 
Temporary workers proportion = Number of temporary workers over total employment. 
Proportion of firms with graduates = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm has 
a non-zero number of graduates. 
Proportion of graduates = Number of graduates over total employment. 
Use of digitally controlled machine tools = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the 
firm uses digitally controlled machine tools. 
Use of CAD = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm uses CAD. 
Use of robots = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm uses robots. 
Proportion of firms with R&D expenses = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm 
has non-zero R&D expenditures. 
R&D expenses/Sales (0/00) = R&D expenses divided by sales and multiplied by 1,000. 
Firms introducing process innovations = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm 
reports the accomplishment of product innovations. 
Firms introducing product innovations = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the firm 
reports the introduction of a process innovation in its productive process.  
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Appendix B 
The Technological Innovation Panel (PITEC) is a statistical instrument for studying the 
innovation activities of Spanish firms over time. The database is being constructed by the INE 
(National Statistics Office), which counts on advice from a group of researchers and the 
sponsorship of FECYT and Cotec. The project started in 2004 and its final aim is to improve the 
statistical information available on firms' innovation activities and the conditions for scientific 
research on this topic. PITEC is designed as a panel survey, consisting of repeated observations 
of the same firms over time. The database is placed at the disposal of researchers on the FECYT 
web site, http://sise.fecyt.es/estudios. The data is available in a set of coordinated files, i.e., a 
file for each year (2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 as of today) and fully documented (see, e.g., 
FECYT, 2007). The file corresponding to the last collection of data is added when it becomes 
available, and the files of earlier years could be updated due to corrections in the data. Here 
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Table 1 
Labor productivity growth in Spain, European Union and United States 1995-2003 (average rates 
in %) 













Manufacturing 1.0  2.6 2.8    1.8  3.6  7.1 
Services -0.3  1.3 2.4    0.1  1.2  3.1 
Economy 0.4  1.9 2.2    0.9  1.9  3.5 
Productivity computed as GDP per hour of work. 




Labor productivity growth in Spain, European Union and United States 2000-2006 (rates and average 
rates in %) 
       
2001  2002  2003  2004 2005 2006 2001-2006 
Spain 0.4  0.3  0.0 -0.2  -0.5  0.2  0.1 
EU-15 0.5  0.4  0.7 1.6  0.8  1.3  0.9 
United States  0.8 1.9  1.6 2.5  1.4  1.0  1.6 
Productivity computed as GDP per employee. 




Labor productivity inside the EU 
Source: Fernández and Montolio (2006), Eurostat and INE data, Tables 3 and 1, and Montolio (2008), same sources, Table 1. 
 
 
          
 Level  wrt  EU-25   
Growth rate (average 
rate, %)   
Employment growth rate 
(average rate, %) 
  1995       2000     2005    2000-2006    2000-2006 
EU-25 100.0  100.0  100.0   1.0    0.6 
EU-15 109.3  108.3  106.5   0.8    1.2 
Spain 103.7  97.9  97.3   0.1    3.3 
Catalonia 111.7  102.0  104.6   0.2    3.0  
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Table 4 
Labor productivity by industries in Catalonia, Spain and the EU 
 
        
  Level 2001-2002 (Thousand Euros)   
Growth 1995-2003 
(average rate, %) 
 Catalonia  Spain  EU-25    Catalonia 
Food 44.3  41.9  41.6    2.4 
Textile 28.4  22.7  23.6    1.8 
Wood 24.7  24.8  26.6    2.4 
Paper 47.0  45.8  53.0    2.4 
Chemicals 74.3  72.3  84.1    0.8 
Rubber and plastic  41.3  43.1  43.3    1.3 
Non-metals 55.9  48.8  43.9    2.8 
Metals 37.6  38.0  40.1    1.7 
Machinery 41.9  41.1  46.7    1.3 
Electrical goods  43.5  41.3  46.7    1.4 
Transport equipment  53.0  47.7  54.7    0.5 
Miscellaneous 32.1  25.4  29.8   2.6 
Manufacturing 44.0  41.5  45.3    1.6 


















Catalonia exports and world relative trade advantage by technological content of goods 








High 8.2  -37.0    12.4  -23.4 
Air and spacecraft  0.0  -44.1    0.0  -55.8 
Office, accounting and computing machines  1.8  -44.6    1.1  -61.5 
Electronic, radio, TV and comm. equipment  3.8  -33.1    5.5  -18.8 
Pharmaceutical products  2.5 -36.3    5.7  -10.3 
Medium-High 54.1  -11.5    52.5  -16.5 
Medical, precision and optical instruments 1.4  -57.1    1.8  -53.8 
Motor vehicles  21.2  16.6    20.2  -7.9 
Electrical equipment  6.0  -0.7    4.8  -14.5 
Chemical products  14.8  -29.3    17.1  -11.7 
Other transport equipment  0.7  -15.5    1.5  -5.5 
Machinery and equipment  10.0  -16.0    7.1  -32.5 
Medium-Low 13.7  -23.6    14.2  -31.9 
Rubber and plastic products  4.0  -6.5    4.1  -10.0 
Building and repairing ships  0.1  -27.1    0.2  -60.2 
Manufacturing nec  1.4  -29.9    1.3  -30.2 
Non-ferrous metals  0.8  -51.5    1.1  -41.2 
Non-metallic mineral products  2.4  11.6    1.7  -4.1 
Metal products  2.9  -16.5    2.9  -15.6 
Coke and refined petroleum products  0.9  -55.4    1.1  -69.5 
Ferrous metals  1.1 -47.3    1.6  -43.9 
Low 24.0  -14.1    20.9  -17.0 
Paper and printing  4.3 -13.5    3.4  -1.2 
Textiles, wearing and leather  9.9 -4.0    7.2 -24.5 
Food, beverages and tobacco 8.1  -25.9    8.9  -10.6 
Wood and cork products  1.7  -0.7    1.4  -37.2 
Total 100  -16.7    100  -20.1 






 X − M
X + M
   X − M
X + M 
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Table 6 
Firms' strategies to enhance productivity: Catalonia 
   Small firms     Big firms 
   1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006     1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006 
Costs                                        
Price Cost Margin  0.142  0.122  0.120  0.111  0.110  0.118     0.126  0.113  0.122  0.121  0.108  0.115 
Cost of funds  0.149  0.113  0.064  0.056  0.041  0.042     0.127  0.096  0.058  0.050  0.038  0.039 
Wage (thousand Euros)  16.4  19.6  21.9  24.6  28.1  31.5     22.9  29.5  32.2  34.5  37.9  43.0 
Labor unit cost (Wage bill/Output)  0.307  0.310  0.275  0.277  0.289  0.278     0.259  0.253  0.225  0.206  0.207  0.194 
Product differentiation                                        
Product is standard  0.595  0.597  0.619  0.513  0.491  0.494     0.687  0.737  0.730  0.786  0.663  0.647 
Advertising                                        
  Proportion of firms that advertise  0.598  0.669  0.661  0.688  0.676  0.686     0.810  0.876  0.825  0.807  0.752  0.733 
  Expenditure over sales (0/00)  2.4  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.7     3.3  3.5  3.5  4.1  2.8  3.3 
Human capital                                        
Temporary workers                                        
  Proportion of firms with temp. w.  0.745  0.753  0.732  0.679  0.572  0.506     0.908  0.905  0.889  0.886  0.851  0.776 
  Temporary workers proportion  0.319  0.297  0.253  0.191  0.155  0.136     0.182  0.165  0.162  0.135  0.109  0.110 
Graduates                                        
  Proportions of firms with graduates  0.670  0.677  0.677  0.714  0.728  0.788     0.988  0.985  0.992  0.993  1.000  1.000 
  Proportion of graduates  0.122  0.120  0.120  0.143  0.149  0.167     0.100  0.126  0.132  0.169  0.161  0.200 
Technology adoption                                        
Use of digitally controlled mac-tools  0.216  0.312  0.327  0.379  0.445  0.433     0.448  0.474  0.476  0.621  0.663  0.595 
Use of CAD  0.167  0.224  0.210  0.313  0.329  0.359     0.399  0.431  0.444  0.543  0.535  0.526 
Use of robots  0.082  0.118  0.097  0.134  0.139  0.224     0.405  0.431  0.405  0.521  0.485  0.500 
Source: Computed with ESEE data.   
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Table 6 (continued) 
Firms' strategies to enhance productivity: Comparisons 2006 
 
   Catalonia     Rest of Spain     Madrid 
   Small firms  Big firms     Small firms  Big firms     Small firms  Big firms 
Costs                         
Price Cost Margin  0.118  0.115     0.118  0.123     0.112  0.137 
Cost of funds  0.042  0.039     0.043  0.041     0.041  0.045 
Wage (thousand Euros)  31.5  43.0     25.8  39.0     30.0  44.5 
Labor unit cost (Wage bill/Output)  0.278  0.194     0.295  0.201     0.315  0.226 
Product differentiation                         
Product is standard  0.494  0.647     0.574  0.620     0.483  0.556 
Advertising                         
  Proportion of firms that advertise  0.686  0.733     0.711  0.728     0.730  0.689 
  Expenditure over sales (0/00)  1.7  3.3     1.3  2.2     1.6  2.1 
Human capital                         
Temporary workers                         
  Proportion of firms with temp. w.  0.506  0.776     0.618  0.866     0.526  0.800 
  Temporary workers proportion  0.167  0.110     0.244  0.164     0.157  0.125 
Graduates                         
  Proportions of firms with graduates  0.788  1.000     0.677  1.000     0.687  1.000 
  Proportion of graduates  0.167  0.200     0.150  0.178     0.164  0.318 
Technology adoption                         
Use of digitally controlled mac-tools  0.433  0.595     0.429  0.670     0.422  0.600 
Use of CAD  0.359  0.526     0.329  0.534     0.361  0.467 
Use of robots  0.224  0.500     0.186  0.555     0.130  0.511 
Source: Computed with ESEE data.  
 
IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 29 
Table 7 
R&D expenditures (% of GDP) 
 
   Total     Private     Public 
   1995  2000  2004     1995  2000  2004     1995  2000  2004 
EU-25  1.81  1.86  1.86     1.14  1.22  1.22     0.67  0.64  0.65 
EU-15  1.85  1.91  1.92     1.17  1.27  1.26     0.68  0.65  0.66 
Spain  0.79  0.91  1.07     0.39  0.50  0.58     0.40  0.41  0.49 
Catalonia  0.88  1.06  1.34     0.55  0.72  0.88     0.33  0.34  0.44 
  Source: Eurostat. 
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Table 8 
R&D and innovation at the firm level 
 
   Small firms     Big firms 
   1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006     1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006 
Catalonia                                        
Proportion of firms with R&D expenses  0.307  0.300  0.296  0.313  0.283  0.355     0.798  0.796  0.778  0.700  0.743  0.776 
R&D expenses/Sales (0/00)  2.6  2.3  2.1  2.1  1.4  2.3     1.6  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.6 
Firms introducing process innovations  0.294  0.346  0.311  0.326  0.208  0.278     0.552  0.628  0.516  0.614  0.426  0.534 
Firms introducing product innovations  0.235  0.255  0.245  0.246  0.191  0.204     0.423  0.482  0.389  0.543  0.416  0.371 
                                         
Rest of Spain                                        
Proportion of firms with R&D expenses  0.148  0.159  0.182  0.173  0.165  0.186     0.644  0.690  0.681  0.691  0.660  0.670 
R&D expenses/Sales (0/00)  2.6  2.4  2.2  2.4  2.6  2.4     1.6  1.7  1.7  1.4  1.4  1.6 
Firms introducing process innovations  0.257  0.246  0.289  0.268  0.168  0.203     0.527  0.499  0.543  0.564  0.365  0.393 
Firms introducing product innovations  0.184  0.195  0.206  0.185  0.122  0.130     0.385  0.391  0.454  0.428  0.302  0.356 
                                         
Madrid                                        
Proportion of firms with R&D expenses  0.159  0.208  0.231  0.177  0.156  0.196     0.701  0.758  0.787  0.655  0.711  0.511 
R&D expenses/Sales (0/00)  3.4  3.3  2.9  2.1  2.3  3.1     3.0  2.7  3.0  2.2  2.2  2.0 
Firms introducing process innovations  0.210  0.198  0.347  0.298  0.176  0.196     0.517  0.484  0.557  0.466  0.400  0.378 
Firms introducing product innovations  0.203  0.217  0.247  0.189  0.141  0.139     0.437  0.387  0.607  0.500  0.400  0.289 
Source: Computed with ESEE data. 
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Table 9 
Innovation and productivity: Estimating the impact of innovation 
 
Dependent variable: ln Sales; Sample period: 2003-2006 
Estimated method: OLS 
                 
   1  2  3  4  5 
   All  Performers  All  Manufac. perf.  Services perf. 
                 
consM   4.21  3.786  4.103  3.818    
   (0.048)  (0.056)  (0.047)  (0.056)    
consS  3.860  3.430  3.737     3.461 
   (0.046)  (0.054)  (0.046)     (0.096) 
NoR& D×group        0.717       
         (0.043)       
k  0.177  0.131  0.160  0.114  0.143 
   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.015) 
l  0.799  0.786  0.787  0.880  0.710 
   (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
                 
c  0.055  0.162  0.092  0.125  0.187 
   (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.009)  (0.014) 
                 
Industry dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Time dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
                 
R
2
  0.81  0.82  0.82  0.82  0.81 
                 
No. Firms    9,850    8,413    9,850    5,343  3,070 
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Table 10 
Innovation and productivity: the impact of geographic organization of innovation 
 
Dependent variable: ln Sales; Sample period: 2003-2006     
Estimated method: OLS         
       
  1 2 3 4 
  Manufac. perf.  Services perf.  Manufac. perf.  Services perf. 
      
consM /S  3.796 3.465 3.802 3.484 
  (0.056) (0.096) (0.056) (0.097) 
k  0.119 0.150 0.119 0.150 
  (0.009) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015) 
l  0.878 0.708 0.877 0.707 
  (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) 
  0.799 0.786 0.787 0.880 
      
c  0.115 0.170 0.115 0.168 
  (0.009) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014) 
      
0.166 0.233 0.164 0.221              (R&D in Catalonia or       
Madrid) 
(0.020) (0.038) (0.020) (0.038) 
      
   0.971  2.387        (R&D in Catalonia or 
Madrid)     (0.528)  (1.169) 
      
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes 
Time dummies  yes yes yes yes 
      
R
2
  0.82 0.82 0.82 0.82 
      
No. Firms    5,343  3,070    5,343  3,070 









 sC + sM 
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Table 11 
Cost advantages, product innovation and exports in Manufacturing 
 
Dep. variable: (1) Dummy of exports; (2) to (5) ln Exports. S. period: 2003-2006 
Estimated method: OLS 
  
   1  2  3  4  5 
Cons  0.189  8.125  8.667  8.135  8.157 
   (0.028)  (0.101)  (0.092)  (0.101)  (0.102) 
                 
-0.001  0.615  0.338  0.620  0.714  Non-innovation cost advantages 
(0.010)  (0.116)  (0.113)  (0.116)  (0.131) 
                 
0.224  1.330     1.299  1.212  Innovation-related cost advantages 
(0.023)  (0.112)     (0.115)  (0.144) 
                 
Product innovation  0.086     0.242  0.047  0.036 
   (0.001)     (0.047)  (0.047)  (0.055) 
                 
ln Size  0.070  1.247  1.294  1.243  1.246 
   (0.004)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.021) 
                 
Non-innov. c.a. ×Catalonia              -0.597 
               (0.269) 
Innov. Rel. c.a. ×Catalonia              0.051 
               (0.113) 
Product innov. c.a ×Catalonia              0.062 
               (0.099) 
                 
R
2  0.09  0.52  0.51  0.52  0.52 
                 
No. Firms    5,764    4,478    4,478    4,478    4,478 
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Table A1 
Industry composition of Catalonia and Madrid subsamples 2006 
 
   Small firms     Big firms 
   1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006     1991  1994  1997  2000  2003  2006 
Catalonia                                        
No. of firms  306  263  257  224  173  245     163  137  126  140  101  116 
No. of workers  43.9  50.9  47.2  48.5  50.1  51.1     669.6  572.7  619.0  628.5  529.0  504.7 
Investment p. worker (000’s Euros)  3.4  3.3  4.8  5.8  7.0  4.6     7.5  5.0  8.2  9.1  9.2  8.9 
Proportion of firms with exports  0.392  0.498  0.584  0.585  0.590  0.665     0.920  0.934  0.976  0.936  0.960  0.914 
Export intensity (Exports/Sales)  0.179  0.245  0.228  0.257  0.256  0.262     0.223  0.283  0.321  0.370  0.421  0.398 
                                         
Rest of Spain                                        
No. of firms  886  829  1011  932  721  1117     452  345  326  353  285  382 
No. of workers  38.1  43.4  46.6  46.2  46.8  47.7     704.9  658.6  661.5  732.5  790.7  681.0 
Investment p. worker (000’s Euros)  3.4  2.7  4.1  5.4  5.1  5.7     6.3  4.6  5.9  9.4  8.4  11.5 
Proportion of firms with exports  0.292  0.396  0.483  0.486  0.476  0.475     0.819  0.887  0.936  0.949  0.930  0.893 
Export intensity (Exports/Sales)  0.233  0.246  0.250  0.242  0.240  0.233     0.24  0.305  0.365  0.361  0.390  0.375 
                                         
Madrid                                        
No. of firms  138  106  308  238  199  230     87  62  61  58  45  45 
No. of workers  42.9  51.3  54.1  53.4  50.1  48.2     587.0  796.0  649.9  690.3  522.8  599.5 
Investment p. worker (000’s Euros)  4.2  3.3  3.4  5.4  4.9  5.1     7.1  4.0  4.8  7.1  6.4  6.7 
Proportion of firms with exports  0.268  0.377  0.487  0.525  0.477  0.487     0.816  0.935  0.967  0.983  1.000  0.889 
Export intensity (Exports/Sales)  0.104  0.160  0.213  0.217  0.205  0.211     0.148  0.247  0.304  0.300  0.432  0.337 
    Source: Computed with ESEE data.  
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Tables A2 
Industry composition of Catalonia and Madrid subsamples 2006 
 
   Catalonia     Madrid 
   Small firms  Big firms     Small firms  Big firms 
Food  0.069  0.120     0.061  0.022 
Textile  0.179  0.069     0.065  0.044 
Wood  0.057  0.017     0.074  0.044 
Paper  0.098  0.112     0.183  0.311 
Chemicals, rubber and plastic  0.147  0.268     0.087  0.155 
Non-metals  0.037  0.034     0.043  0.044 
Metals, machinery  0.309  0.138     0.308  0.133 
Electrical goods  0.037  0.103     0.100  0.133 
Transport equipment  0.049  0.112     0.043  0.111 
Miscellaneous  0.016  0.026     0.035  0.000 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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